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Abstract 
Homeownership is increasingly understood by policy makers and social scientists as a 
fundamental asset against poverty risks, especially in times of economic uncertainty. However, in 
several Western countries, homeownership among younger generations appears to be increasingly 
difficult to achieve, likely due to growing employment instability and stringent criteria to access 
credit. This article uses multinomial logistic models and nationally representative EU-SILC data 
from six European countries to examine a) to what extent precarious employment among young 
couples is linked to being a mortgage holder; b) whether earned income can compensate for 
employment instability in being a mortgagee; c) cross-national differences in the relationship 
between being a mortgage holder, earnings, and employment insecurity. Our results indicate that the 
higher the levels of employment insecurity, the lower the chances of being a mortgage holder in all 
countries. Moreover, we find that at a given level of employment insecurity, households with higher 
levels of earned income have higher chances of being mortgage holders than households with lower 
earned income. However, while earned income has a stronger effect in achieving a mortgage among 
couples who have secure employment in Italy, earnings are more important among couples with 
lower levels of employment security in France, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Poland. These 
results suggest that the relationship between social inequalities and housing is partially mediated by 
the national context. 
 
Keywords: housing, mortgage, Europe, employment instability, earned income. 
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Introduction 
This article addresses inequalities in homeownership by asking to what extent employment 
instability and earned income are relevant in being mortgage holders among young couples (18-35 
years old) in six European countries: Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, the United Kingdom, and 
France. 
Housing can be described as a “complex welfare good that supplements or mediates the 
provision of other welfare services at the household level” (Doling and Ronald, 2010: p. 166). 
Homeownership, in particular, represents a long-term economic investment that secures both 
present and future economic and living conditions, and that can be passed on to younger generations 
(Boehm and Schlottmann, 1999). Indeed, Doling and Ronald (2010) speak of a shift from state-
managed social provisions towards an asset-based form of welfare, in which individual housing 
wealth can be used as protection against poverty risks. Thus, within the framework of a progressive 
retreat of the welfare state from the direct provision of housing services, the ownership of a house 
has become an important asset for young couples. 
Given the importance of homeownership, it is somewhat worrisome that young people in several 
countries are finding it increasingly difficult to buy a property compared to former generations 
(Housing Europe, 2015). Indeed, thanks to the development of a huge range of mortgage products 
in the last decades and the liberalization of the mortgage market in many western European 
countries (Scanlon et al., 2008), purchasing a house should be easier than in the past. To the 
contrary, growing housing prices (Scanlon et al., 2008), increasing youth unemployment and 
employment instability (Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016; de Lange et al., 2014), make it difficult for 
young generations to become homeowners (Kurz and Blossfeld, 2004; Lennartz et al., 2015; 
Housing Europe, 2015). These difficulties have also been tied to the delayed transition to adulthood 
that occurs especially in southern European countries (Billari, 2004). 
Previous studies have identified employment insecurity and earnings as two important but 
distinct predictors of homeownership. Instead, this study advances our understanding by asking to 
what extent employment instability and earned income are interrelated in the probability of being 
mortgage holders among young European couples. On the one hand, having a stable employment 
that guarantees a constant inflow of earnings is necessary for obtaining a mortgage, but it is a 
condition that young generations find increasingly hard to meet given their overrepresentation in 
forms of temporary and unstable employment. Indeed, scholars have long debated on the pros and 
cons of temporary contracts, especially whether they represent a stepping stone or a dead-end for 
younger generations of workers in different institutional settings (Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016; Gebel 
and Giesecke, 2016). On the other hand, net of employment insecurity, having a high level of 
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earned income should facilitate obtaining a mortgage, if anything else because it should signal 
greater savings capacity and make it easier to secure the initial down payment (Lersch and Dewilde, 
2015; Scanlon et al., 2008). 
However, in times of economic uncertainty, employment stability and high earned income may 
not be enough on their own to secure access to a mortgage, and a combination of the two might be 
required. Moreover, households play a relevant role in compensating individual market risks, but 
this role is strongly limited when household members have insecure labor market positions (Grotti 
and Scherer, 2014). Thus, household members who are better off because they have open-ended 
contracts and high earnings could be getting the additional advantage of accessing homeownership 
via mortgages, while less advantaged households are potentially being left behind, ultimately 
deepening existing social inequalities.  
Using multinomial logistic regression models on data from the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, 2010/2012), we test whether employment stability, 
earned income, or their combination are necessary for being mortgage holders in Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Poland, the United Kingdom and France, which are countries with different housing and 
welfare systems. Our results show that, in all countries, households with higher levels of earned 
income and greater employment security have higher chances of being mortgage holders than 
households with lower earned income or a lower level of job security. Importantly, we find 
evidence of cross-national variations in the interplay between employment security and earnings. 
High earnings increase the chances for couples with only one earner to be mortgage holders in 
Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Therefore, earnings act as a buffer against employment 
instability. Instead, we find no evident interaction between high earnings and employment 
insecurity in Germany and France, whereas earned income is associated with greater inequalities 
among secure households in Italy. 
 
Background 
The micro-level: income, employment insecurity and their interplay 
A well-established finding in the literature on homeownership is the relevance of employment 
stability and personal finances for purchasing a property. For the United States, both earned income 
and wealth have been found to be relevant to become a homeowner (Quercia et al., 2003). The 
various single-country case studies in the seminal volume by Kurz and Blossfed (2004) also show 
how access to homeownership has become increasingly dependent on class, labor market position 
and income in European countries. Lersch and Dewilde (2015) discovered that labor market 
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insecurity negatively affects the likelihood of being a homeowner in many European countries, 
especially in those with a marketized housing system. Similarly, Diaz-Serrano (2005) shows that 
households with volatile earnings and credit constraints are less likely to own their house. 
These findings have troubling implications for the perpetuation of social inequalities, as 
homeownership is not only associated with better current and future living conditions: it also allows 
the accumulation of assets that can be transferred to the next generations. The fact that becoming a 
homeowner requires a steady inflow of labor-related income is especially problematic in the light of 
the increasing segmentation of the labor market that took place over the past decades (Barbieri and 
Cutuli, 2016). Indeed, consequent to the shift towards a post-industrial economic system, the 
workforce is increasingly divided into two categories: the “insiders”, workers with protected job 
positions, and the “outsiders”, such as flexible and temporary workers, and certain categories of 
self-employed. Labor market outsiders are considerably more likely to experience periods where 
maintaining a constant inflow of earnings to sustain housing costs might be difficult, especially 
compared to “insiders” positions. Since temporary employment has become the principal way by 
which youth enter the labor market (Bruno et al., 2012), new generations are more economically 
vulnerable compared to their predecessors because of their overrepresentation in less stable labor 
market positions (Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016). Indeed, temporary labor market positions can be a 
stepping stone toward a prospective permanent labor market position or a dead-end trap between 
temporary contracts and periods of unemployment (Gebel, 2015; Booth et al., 2002; Bruno et al., 
2012; Scarpetta, 2014), especially under certain institutional configurations (Barbieri and Cutuli, 
2016; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). Therefore, to increase our understanding of the integrative power 
of instable labor market positions, it is increasingly relevant to focus on a “downward comparison” 
between temporary contracts and unemployement (Gebel, 2015:5) in addition to an “upward 
comparison” between temporary and permanent contracts. 
Concerning homeownership. on the one hand, young adults are often not eligible for a mortgage 
because they lack the economic resources for the initial down payment (Lersch and Dewilde, 2015); 
on the other hand, even if they do qualify for a mortgage, they risk not being able to pay (Lennartz 
et al., 2015). In sum, due to higher job insecurity, young generations have greater difficulties in 
making a large financial commitment, such as a mortgage, compared to previous cohorts. 
Temporary and insecure employment, however, does not inevitably entail negative economic 
consequences. Indeed, if temporary workers are paid above average, have the same, or better, social 
security of insiders (regarding cash benefits for unemployment, for instance) and have a high 
chance of finding another job when the contract expires, the risks tied to insecure employment are 
minimal and temporary labor market positions are more likely to act as bridges than traps (Booth et 
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al., 2002). The extent to which these conditions occur largely depends on the country’s labor market 
characteristics (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016) and social security systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
However, usually outsiders have lower earnings and lower social protection (Booth et al., 2002; 
Bruno et al., 2012; Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that insecure 
employment would hinder the chances of being owners with a mortgage. Nonetheless, there are 
exceptions to this. Indeed, certain types of self-employed jobs entail high earnings but have no job 
security whatsoever. In these cases, having high earnings should, to some extent, limit the negative 
consequences of insecure employment positions. Moreover, household characteristics can moderate 
the negative effects of employment insecurity (Grotti and Scherer, 2014). Thus, even households 
where only one partner has a stable employment position and high earnings could have higher 
chances of being mortgage holders. Based on this reasoning, we have developed three micro-level 
hypotheses: 
H1 – Earnings: Net of employment insecurity, households with higher earnings are more likely 
to be mortgage holders than households with lower income. 
H2 – Employment insecurity: Net of income, households with greater employment security are 
more likely to be mortgage holders than less secure households. 
H3 – High earnings as a buffer: Among households with higher earnings, the negative effect of 
employment insecurity should be weaker than among households with lower earnings. 
Beyond the individual level, nation-specific economic and institutional settings and labor market 
characteristics play an important role in hampering or enhancing the negative consequences of 
insecure employment. These differences, discussed in the following section, likely lead to important 
cross-national variations in the effects of employment insecurity and earnings on the probability of 
being mortgage holders. 
The macro-level: welfare regimes, labor markets, and housing systems 
The relationship between employment insecurity, income and being mortgage holders is bound 
to be affected by macro-level national characteristics, in particular welfare regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990), labor markets (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016; Scarpetta, 2014), and housing market 
structures (Kemeny, 2005). Thus, for the analysis, we have selected six European countries that 
differ in these areas: Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Poland and the UK. In the following 
paragraphs, we discuss the traits of each country − summarized in Table 1 − and we use them to 
develop our macro-level hypotheses. 
[Table 1 here] 
Germany traditionally belongs to the conservative/corporatist welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 
1990), although it has somewhat deviated over the years from the initial model due to labor market 
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and family policy reforms (Spiess and Wrohlich, 2008). The national level of youth unemployment 
is quite low, and apprenticeship contracts alleviate the transition from school to work (O’Higgins, 
2012). Employment protection legislation (EPL) for permanent contracts is well developed (OECD, 
2016) while the partial and targeted deregulation of temporary contracts make these rather common 
among young workers (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016; de Lange et al., 2014). The German housing 
situation displays relatively low levels of homeownership (Kurtz, 2004) and a much richer rental 
market (Voigtländer, 2014). Because of this, low income households can resort to rentals while they 
save up for the large down payment that is required in the prudential, fixed-rate, long-term German 
mortgage system (Andrews et al., 2011; Voigtländer, 2014). Purchasing a house is less attractive in 
Germany than in other countries also because of the non-deductibility of taxes on mortgage interest 
for owners who occupy their dwelling (Scanlon et al., 2008) and because of the comparatively high 
transaction costs related to its purchase (European Central Bank, 2009). According to Kemeny’s 
classification (1995; 2005) the German rental market can be defined as unitary or tenure neutral, 
where there is no clear government preference towards a given tenure status. 
Italy belongs to the Southern European welfare model (Ferrera, 1996) and the conservative 
welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Its rigid labor market presents an insider-outsider divide 
along the lines of age and gender produced by the partial and targeted deregulation of temporary 
employment (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). The difficulties of Italian youth in achieving 
independence from their family of origin are well-documented in previous studies (Billari, 2004). 
Overall, the national housing system is characterized by the dominant preference toward 
homeownership and by a very limited rental market (Baldini and Poggio, 2014). However, only 
recently Italy has developed a mortgage market in line with the rest of Europe (Aalbers, 2007). Up 
to the 1990s, loans were given for small amounts and short periods of time, and had high 
transaction costs (Del Boca and Lusardi, 2003). The liberalization of the mortgage market in 1992 
with foreign banks entering the loan market led to an increase in the number of households 
accessing a mortgage. Public interventions supporting first-time buyers are fragmented and mainly 
managed at the regional level, with the private market left to its dynamics (Kurz and Blossfeld, 
2004; Baldini and Poggio, 2014). Therefore, intergenerational transfers are still common 
alternatives to the credit market for the purchase of a house for young family members (Castles and 
Ferrera, 1996; Del Boca and Lusardi, 2003; Stephens, 2003). This scenario reflects what Kemeny 
(1995; 2005) theorized as a dualist rental system. 
Spain, another Southern European welfare state, is characterized by a growing use of temporary 
work contracts (O’Higgins, 2012), recent reductions of EPL for permanent employment (Gebel and 
Giesecke, 2016) and mismatches between the educational system and the labor market (Brzinsky-
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Fay, 2007). The Spanish rental system fits within Kemeny’s dualist system, in which direct and 
indirect public policy interventions tend to favor owner-occupation. Indeed, Spain displays a 
relatively high level of homeownership which occurred thanks to the rapid growth experienced by 
the country during the second half of the twentieth century. Traditionally, the high Spanish rate of 
homeownership made home leaving difficult (Mulder, 2006) and the family of origin played a 
crucial role in helping young people buy a house (Fuentes et al., 2013; Castles and Ferrera, 1996; 
Kurtz and Blossfeld, 2004). It is against this background that the speculative housing boom 
occurred. Eventually, the interplay between real estate growth and the diffusion of subprime 
practices in the context of a strong promotion of homeownership hit the wall of the Great Economic 
Recession. During those years, hundreds of thousands of mortgagees were no longer able to sustain 
their mortgage payments and an overwhelmingly large number of evictions and repossessions took 
place (Fuentes et al., 2013). 
France is “a problem for the model builders” (Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003: p. 255) since it 
falls between the northern European and conservative type of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Unlike other nations, in its transition towards a post-industrial economy France implemented anti-
poverty programs to enlarge its basic safety nets against the inequalities generated by labor market 
transformations. These programs focused on the provision of minimum guarantees to workers 
holding non-standard labor positions to tackle the deepening divide between insiders and outsiders 
(Palier and Thelen, 2012). France has a so-called unitary rental system (Kemeny, 1995; 2005), in 
which there is no clear government preference toward a specific tenure, although Scanlon and 
Whitehead (2004) claim that the taxation system is biased towards owner-occupation. Indeed, the 
national housing market is rather heterogeneous, with a strong social housing sector managed by the 
Habitation à loyer modéré organizations and a relevant share of owners with mortgages (European 
Central Bank, 2009). Several programs aid households to undertake such financial commitment, 
among which interest-free mortgages for up to a third of the sum needed and public guarantees to 
back up the mortgage or loans cost (European Central Bank 2009; Neuteboom, 2004). Moreover, 
the public program prêt pour l’accession sociale (PAS) helps low-income household to undertake a 
mortgage (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004). 
Poland has been classified by Fenger2 (2007) as a post-communist European welfare system. 
The restructuring of the economic system in the post 1989-era lead to fluctuations in GDP growth 
                                                 
2 Fenger (2007) developed a classification for Central and Eastern European welfare regimes identifying three 
clusters: the Former-USSR type (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine), the Post-communist European 
type (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) and the developing welfare state type (Georgia, 
Romania, Moldova). 
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and unemployment, increases in socio-economic inequalities, youth unemployment and in general 
to a growing vulnerability of families, which became more dependent on their private assets and 
labor market incomes (Kotowska et al., 2008). During the transition period, Poland underwent a 
process of privatization of the formerly public housing stock, which consisted mainly of the sale of 
dwellings to existing tenants implemented by local authorities (Stephens, 2003; Stephens et al. 
2016). This process influenced the Polish housing system, which presents very high levels of 
owner-occupation, an underdeveloped rental market (Radzimski, 2014), low levels of mortgage 
debt (Fisher and Jaffe, 2003; Stephens et al. 2016) but increasing housing loans (European Central 
Bank, 2009). Moreover, the national government has introduced measures to economically support 
young people who want to become homeowners, such as the “Flat for the Youth” program, where 
state subsidies contribute to the down payment for housing purchases (Hypostat, 2015). Kemeny’s 
classification does not engage directly with the analysis of the Polish rental system. However, it can 
be considered a dualist one like Italy and Spain, due to the state’s support for homeownership. 
The United Kingdom is the European representative of the liberal welfare regime (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). The insider/outsider divide is much less pronounced in the UK than in Germany, 
Spain, and Italy due to its less restrictive employment protection legislation (OECD, 2016). 
Nonetheless, a secondary job market made of bad-quality part-time and temporary jobs absorbs a 
good portion of low-skilled workers (Booth et al., 2002). Moreover, there is a relatively low level of 
coordination between the labor market and the vocational training system, making younger cohorts’ 
transition from education to work rather difficult (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007). The dualist rental system 
(Kemeny, 1995; 2005) − characterized by a high share of owner-occupiers − saw a prolonged trend 
of rising prices both in the rental and owner occupation sector. The country experienced a 
deregulation of the mortgage markets in the late seventies, which resulted in a greater availability of 
loans (Stephens, 2007). Indeed, for several years the English mortgage market was considered 
among the most accessible (Bicakova and Sierminska, 2008) and one from which atypical workers 
were not completely ruled out (Neuteboom, 2004). However, consequent to the Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC), access to mortgage finance has become more restrictive for all but the lowest risk 
borrowers (Scanlon and Adamczuck, 2016). Indeed, the GFC ended the 2000s period of more 
relaxed borrowing conditions and with the mortgage market review of 2014, the government limited 
the diffusion of unconventional mortgage products and introduced more stringent affordability 
assessments for the borrower. Meanwhile, the “Help to buy” program was introduced to combine a 
reorganization of the mortgage market with governmental aid schemes (Scanlon and Adamczuck, 
2016). 
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Based on the cross-national differences in housing systems, labor protection legislation and 
welfare systems, we expect the relationship between insecure employment and income to vary 
depending on the context. Specifically, we formulate the following macro-level hypotheses: 
H4 – Labor market protection: In segmented and rigid labor markets, temporary workers face 
greater economic uncertainty compared to employees with open-ended contracts. Therefore, 
employment insecurity is expected to have the strongest negative effect on being a mortgage holder 
in countries with stricter employment protection legislation (Italy and Germany). 
H5 – Mortgage availability: Employment insecurity and low earnings should not reduce the 
chances of obtaining a loan if mortgages are widely available. Therefore, they are expected to have 
the weakest negative effect on being a mortgage holder in countries that experienced a deregulation 
of the mortgage markets before the period under study (Spain and the United Kingdom). 
H6 – Policies for vulnerable households: If policies are enacted to protect temporary and low-
earning workers from economic uncertainty, employment conditions and earnings should not be 
strongly associated with the chances of being a mortgage holder. Thus, employment insecurity and 
low earnings are expected to have the weakest negative effect on being a mortgage holder in 
countries that implemented policies to help low income and vulnerable households (France and 
Poland). 
 
Data, variables and method 
We analyze data from three waves of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC 20103, 2011 and 2012), a database that produces comparable, timely and 
nationally representative cross-sectional and longitudinal data on income, poverty, and social 
exclusion. It is a suitable data source for our analysis as it includes information at the individual 
(employment status and earnings) and household level (housing tenure). Our sample consists of 
young adults in couples age 18 to 35 in Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Poland, and the United 
Kingdom. Focusing on couples rather than individuals allows us to address the important issue of 
whether households can compensate for individual market risks (Grotti and Scherer, 2014). 
We analyze housing tenure4 status using a categorical dependent variable with four outcomes 
that distinguish between being: 1) the owner paying a mortgage; 2) the tenant or subtenant paying 
                                                 
3
 Data for Germany and Italy in 2010 are not available. The analyses were run also for each year separately and the 
results are consistent.  
4 
Subjects who completely own their house (i.e. are not paying a mortgage) have been excluded from the analyses 
because their employment condition is unlikely to affect their rather secure and “safe” housing situation. 
11 
 
rent at prevailing or market rate; 3) the tenant paying a reduced rate; 4) living in the accommodation 
for free. 
The first independent variable is the sum of the gross earnings of the partners. The measure has 
been adjusted by applying purchasing power parities (base EU28) to allow cross-national 
comparisons. It was then median-centered and divided by 1000. Since the countries differ in their 
earnings distribution, it is not meaningful to directly compare the coefficients for earnings among 
the models for different countries. Thus, when presenting the results, we calculate the predicted 
probabilities of being mortgage holders at three points of the country specific earnings distribution, 
which are the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile. 
The second independent variable concerns the employment situation of the couple, which we 
built by crossing the employment status (employed vs. not employed), the type of employment 
(employee vs. self-employed) and, for employees, the type of contract (permanent vs. temporary) of 
both partners. Table 2 summarizes the criteria for the construction of the variable. The first category 
comprises couples where both partners are employees with a permanent contract (“Both secure” 
used as reference category). The second category comprises couples where one member is an 
employee with a permanent contract, and the other is either self-employed or an employee with a 
temporary contract (“One secure and a half”). Our third category includes couples where only one 
member has a permanent contract and the other is not employed (“One secure”). Our fourth 
category (“Insecure”) comprises couples where no one has a permanent contract, i.e., two 
employees with a temporary contract, two self-employed, and a mix of one temporary and one non-
employed partner.  
[Table 2 here] 
Other variables included in the models are: the age of the oldest member of the household; the 
marital status of the couple (married = 0, not married = 1); the level of education of both partners: 
up to lower secondary as reference category (ISCED 0, 1 and 2), completed upper secondary 
(ISCED 3), more than upper secondary (ISCED 4 and 5); a numerical variable indicating the 
number of children in the household; a categorical variable tapping the age of the smallest child (No 
children as reference category, from 0 to 1 year old, 2 to 4, 5 and above); the population density of 
the area of residence (densely populated as reference category, intermediate, thinly populated); and 
the year of the study (earliest year available as reference). Table 3 reports summary statistics for 
each country and the overall sample. 
[Table 3 here] 
For the analyses we rely on multinomial logistic regression models, the standard approach for 
modeling a dependent nominal variable (Long and Freese, 2014). To test our cross-national 
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hypotheses, we run four models separately by country5: the first model includes only the control 
variables; the second model adds the insecurity variable, and the third model also includes the 
earnings variable; finally, the fourth model comprises the interaction between earnings and 
employment insecurity. For space limitations, we present model 4 in the appendix. Rather than 
referring to the coefficients in the tables that are not straightforward to interpret, we discuss the 
results displayed in graphical form in Figures 1 and 2, that report the predicted probabilities of 
being a mortgage holder in each country by the level of household insecurity and earned income. 
Predictions were obtained from the coefficients of model 4. 
 
Results 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the dependent variable in each country. Mortgages are very 
common in Spain (0.70), followed by the UK (0.56). The diffusion of mortgages in this age group is 
relatively similar in France (0.43), Italy (0.41), and Poland (0.40) while this tenure status is the least 
common in Germany (0.25). Renting an apartment at market price is the most common solution for 
German youth (0.66), while it is not nearly as common in the other countries. Renting at a reduced 
price is most common in France (0.21) and to a smaller extent in the United Kingdom (0.12), while 
it is uncommon in the remaining countries (0.05 in Germany, 0.02 in Spain, about 0.05 in Italy and 
nearly 0.06 in Poland). Finally, living in the accommodation for free is nearly as common as having 
a mortgage in Poland (0.36) and it is quite common in Italy as well (0.22). In contrast, this housing 
tenure is undertaken only by a minority of couples in Germany (0.04), Spain (0.07), France (0.04) 
and the United Kingdom (0.01). 
As for the employment situation of the couple, Table 3 shows that the both secure and one secure 
and a half categories are more present in the UK, Germany, and France than Spain, Italy and 
Poland. This distribution reflects official data on female labor force participation and youth 
unemployment and is in line with the devastating effects of the recent economic crisis. Another 
well-known pattern that emerges is the widespread presence of one earner households in Germany 
(0.27) and Italy (0.27). 
To what extent is the probability of being a mortgage holder associated with different levels of 
earned income and employment (in)security? To answer this question, Figure 1 reports the 
                                                 
5 
As a robustness check, we also estimated a pooled model with country fixed effects and three-way-interactions 
between employment insecurity, income and country. The results were substantially the same, therefore we chose to 
report the models separately by country as they allow the effects of the control variables to be country-specific. 
Moreover, since we are focusing on a small set of countries, we chose to model the effects separately by country rather 
than using macro-level indicators to test cross-national differences.  
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predicted probabilities of being a mortgage holder in each of the countries conditioning on the 
earned income of the couple (Panel A); the employment status (Panel B); and the employment 
status at the 75th percentile of the earnings distribution (Panel C). Panel A confirms H1: net of 
employment insecurity, households with earnings above the median (white squares) are more likely 
to have a mortgage than households with income below the median (white dots) in all the six 
countries. However, the differences between income groups are smaller in Spain and the UK than 
elsewhere. Panel B shows that H2 is also confirmed: in all countries, households with greater 
employment security (white dots) are more likely to be mortgage holders than insecure households 
(black squares). However, there are interesting cross-national variations: insecure households are 
considerably less likely than other households to be mortgage holders in countries with rigid labor 
markets such as Germany, Italy and Spain, whereas insecure and one secure households have 
roughly the same probabilities of being mortgage holders in Poland, France and the UK. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Finally, Panel C shows that H3 – i.e. among households with higher earnings, the negative effect 
of employment insecurity should be weaker than among households with lower earnings − is not 
fully confirmed. Indeed, young people with higher earnings but living in insecure households have 
much lower chances of being owners with a mortgage compared to other households with the same 
earnings in Germany, Italy, Spain, and to a smaller extent Poland, whereas in France and the UK 
insecure and one secure households have similar probabilities regardless of their earned income. 
However, earnings do seem to offer protection among one earner households in most countries, 
especially Poland, Italy and Spain. 
To test the macro-level hypotheses, Figure 2 reports the predicted probabilities − derived from 
the multinomial logit model − of being a mortgage holder in each of the countries conditioning on 
the employment status of the couple at three levels of earned income: the 25th percentile (solid line), 
the median (dashed line), and the 75th percentile (dotted line). The figure confirms that the lower the 
couples earned income and the greater the employment insecurity, the lower the chances of being 
mortgage holders. In Germany, the chances of being mortgage holders are not especially high for 
anyone, reflecting the preference for other forms of living arrangements. Couples with higher 
earned income are more likely to be mortgage holders than couples with average or lower earnings, 
but if the employment situation is insecure, then even couples with a high level of earned income 
have relatively low chances of being mortgage holders. In Spain, the overall chances of being 
mortgage holders are very high and are relatively high even among insecure households. However, 
employment insecurity decreases the chances of being mortgage holders among all income groups. 
Particularly striking is the earned income difference among the one secure category, suggesting that 
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earnings play a larger role when there is only one stable worker in the household. In France, secure 
households are overall more likely to have a mortgage compared to other households. Moreover, 
income differences are widest among the members of the insecure group, lending support to the 
income buffer hypothesis. As for Italy, employment insecurity has a strong negative relationship 
with being mortgage holders among median and high earned income couples, while the 
probabilities of being mortgage holders are almost un-affected by employment insecurity among 
low income households. In Poland, at median levels of earned income, the probabilities of being 
mortgage holders are largest for secure households and smallest for insecure ones. Moreover, in 
these two groups, earnings differences are relatively small and not statistically significant. In 
contrast, and similar to Spain, the level of earned income makes a great difference for single earner 
– but secure – households. As for the United Kingdom, the probability of being mortgage holders is 
relatively high. Moreover, differences between earning groups are rather small throughout the 
employment security variable and not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the pattern that emerges 
is similar to the one found in Spain and Poland, as one secure households in the lower part of the 
earned income distribution appear to be just as vulnerable to exclusion from the mortgage market as 
insecure households. 
The cross-national differences in the relationship among the probability of being a mortgage 
holder, employment insecurity, and earned income do not completely match our expectations. First, 
we do not find support for the labor market rigidity hypothesis (H4). In fact, employment insecurity 
does not have a stronger negative effect on being a mortgage holder in Italy and Germany than 
elsewhere. However, compared to other countries and among the high earners, Italy displays a 
much larger difference between secure and insecure couples. As for hypothesis 5, our results do 
show that all subjects regardless of income and employment insecurity have higher chances of 
being mortgage holders in Spain and the United Kingdom compared to couples in other countries. 
However, the negative effect of employment insecurity is visible in both countries, whereas the 
earned income effect is more moderate than elsewhere. Nonetheless, income effects emerge 
strongly among one earner couples. Interestingly, in both countries the largest differences regarding 
earnings can be seen within the one secure category. This situation represents the so-called single 
earner household, consisting in large part of male-breadwinners and female-homemakers. This 
result indicates that earned income is an important predictor for housing tenure among single earner 
households and much less among other household types in Spain and the UK. A similar pattern 
emerged in Poland, where a single earner household with high earned income has roughly the same 
probability of being a mortgage holder as a one and a half secure household with high earned 
income. 
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The hypothesis about policies for vulnerable households (H6) stated that employment insecurity 
and low earnings would have the weakest negative effect on being a mortgage holder in countries 
with policies for mortgage access targeting low income and insecure households (France and 
Poland). Once again, the hypothesis is only partially confirmed, as employment security and earned 
income play a very large role in being a mortgage holder in Poland and a significant, albeit more 
moderate, role in France as well. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
This article has investigated inequalities in homeownership by analyzing whether earned income 
and employment instability play a role in being mortgage holders among young couples in 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, the UK, and France. 
Our study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, most of the research on housing 
outcomes is based on data from the US and the UK (Lennartz et al., 2015), whereas this article 
expands our knowledge on the relationship between household endowments and homeownership to 
other, less studied contexts, such as Eastern and Southern European countries. Second, we combine 
two sources of inequalities that are often studied separately, that is the precariousness of 
employment on the one side (Bicakova and Sierminska, 2008), and earned income on the other side 
(Quercia et al., 2003; Diaz-Serrano, 2005). By focusing on job stability beyond the employed vs. 
not employed dichotomy and by addressing the interplay between earnings and employment 
stability, our study advances a more nuanced understanding of inequality in homeownership. 
Furthermore, our study also addresses the implications of the stepping stone vs. dead-end nature of 
temporary contracts for housing outcomes. Third, by focusing on couples rather than on individuals, 
the article underlines the relevance of the household as important source of protection against 
market risks and it contributes to the demographic literature on the obstacles faced by contemporary 
youth in the transition to adulthood and family formation in Europe. 
The results pointed towards the importance of both employment security and earned income for 
being mortgage holders among young European couples. Indeed, our findings indicate that having 
low earned income and insecure employment reduces the chances of being mortgage holders in all 
six countries. However, cross-national differences in the results suggest that contextual features 
play a role in mediating the relationship between household assets and mortgages, ultimately 
increasing or decreasing inequalities. For example, the relatively small differences between couples 
with different earned income in Spain and the UK suggest that the availability of mortgage products 
at the time of the study facilitated young couples’ housing purchase regardless of their income, with 
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all the medium and long-term consequences that this can entail. In contrast, the large difference 
between households with different levels of earned income and employment insecurity in Italy 
reflects the difficulties young couples face in becoming homeowners in countries characterized by a 
strong dualisation in employment. Indeed, Italian youth are likely to rely on parental resources, if 
they can. 
An additional relevant finding that emerged from the analyses is the difficult situation of 
households with only one earner, especially those who have below average earned income. Indeed, 
in all countries except Germany, these couples have roughly the same low chances of being 
mortgage holders of couples who are completely insecure, suggesting that the one-earner household 
model is likely no longer a way to fully sustain a family, at least among low earners. 
A few shortcomings of the present study need to be acknowledged. First, our article presents a 
static picture of a phenomenon that is intrinsically dynamic. Hence, longitudinal data would be 
more suited to model the relationship between earnings, employment, and mortgage access. 
However, the longitudinal component of the EU-SILC is not quite apt for the scope as i) each wave 
covers a relatively short number of years and ii) the data is at the household rather than individual 
level, making it difficult to track moves from, for example, living in the parental home to becoming 
an owner. Second, our results might be somewhat affected by the fact that the data cover the crucial 
years of the economic recession and financial crisis, hence increasing the number of subjects in 
poor economic conditions. Unfortunately, EU-SILC data before 2010 do not include information on 
mortgages. Hence, a future update of the analyses is recommended to monitor the evolution of 
young people’s access to mortgages as European economies slowly recover. Third, Northern 
Europe is left out of our selection of countries because information on the contract of the 
respondents’ partner is not available, hence impeding the construction of our employment insecurity 
variable at the couple level. Thus, we were not able to address the relationship between 
employment, earnings and mortgages in countries with lower levels of societal inequality. Lastly, 
we do not account for the fact that respondents might have received parental help in accessing the 
mortgage, for example by providing the resources for the down payment, nor can we assess the 
impact of wealth on being mortgage holders. While such information would certainly allow a more 
accurate description of mortgage access especially in some countries, it is, unfortunately, 
unavailable in the dataset. Future studies based on different data could fruitfully address the 
interplay of context, earnings, employment and being mortgage holders while controlling for 
parental resources and wealth. 
To conclude, considering the importance of homeownership for the present and future economic 
well-being of young households (Lersch and Dewilde, 2015) and for the persistence of social 
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inequalities in housing tenure between and within generations (Lennartz et al., 2015), the fact that 
young couples with insecure employment and low earnings have lower chances of being mortgage 
holders compared to more secure households with higher earnings is preoccupying. Especially in 
times of global economic uncertainty and welfare retrenchment, being able to afford a stable place 
to live is of the utmost importance for citizens’ well-being. In contrast, along with employment 
stability, being homeowners appears to be becoming a growing watershed between the younger and 
older generations, the higher and the lower social strata, and ultimately the “winners” and the 
“losers” of contemporary societies. Given the large divide between these two groups, future policies 
in the field should design interventions to address the combined negative effect of insecure 
employment and low earnings on being mortgage holders. Our results suggest that when mortgages 
are widely available, such as in Spain and the UK during the period under investigation, differences 
between income and employment groups are smaller. However, considering the negative medium 
and long-term consequences of “easy lending”, the soundest route lies in the creation or 
reinforcement of social safety nets such as unemployment benefits, basic income and active labor 
market policies, so that even in the event of sudden job loss, individuals can manage their loans 
while searching for a new employment position. Such type of interventions would not only be 
beneficial for vulnerable households who wish to acquire a house safely, but would also contribute 
to a broader reduction of general social inequalities. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1 Relevant country characteristics 
  WELFARE 
SYSTEMS 
HOUSING SYSTEMS LOW INCOME – YOUNG HOUSING 
POLICY MEASURES       
EPL 
GERMANY Conservative-
Corporatist (Esping-
Andersen,1990) 
Low levels of homeownership, 
developed rental market. Unitary 
rental market (Kemeny, 1995; 2005) 
Regulated rental market as an alternative for low 
income groups (Andrews et al., 2011; Voigtländer, 
2014) 
High protection permanent 
contract, partial deregulation for 
temporary employment (Gebel and 
Giesecke, 2016) 
ITALY Southern European 
(Ferrera, 1994). 
Conservative (Esping-
Andersen,1990) 
Dominant role of 
homeownership, low development 
of mortgage market and social 
housing. Dualist rental market 
(Kemeny, 1995; 2005) 
Intergenerational transfers, fragmented public 
intervention, mainly regional level. (Castles and 
Ferrera, 1996; Del Boca and Lusardi, 2003; 
Stephens, 2003; Kurz and Blossfeld, 2004; Baldini 
and Poggio, 2014) 
Insider-outsider divide by 
gender and age. Partial deregulation 
of temporary contracts (Barbieri 
and Cutuli 2016) 
SPAIN Southern European 
(Esping-Andersen,1990) 
High level of homeownership. 
2008 housing bubble burst. Dualist 
rental market (Kemeny, 1995; 2005) 
Importance of family of origin and 
intergenerational transfers (Fuentes et al., 2013; 
Castles and Ferrera, 1996; Kurtz and Blossfeld, 
2004) 
Decrease of protection for 
permanent positions and growing 
use of temporary contracts (Gebel 
and Giesecke, 2016) 
FRANCE Conservative-Nordic 
regime features (Esping-
Andersen,1990) 
Heterogeneous housing market. 
Debated Unitary-Dualist rental 
market (Kemeny, 1995; 2005) 
Anti-poverty programs. Interest free mortgages, 
public guarantees, PAS. (Palier and Thelen, 2012; 
Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004) 
Relatively high protection for 
permanent workers (Scarpetta, 
2014; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016) 
POLAND Post-communist 
European type (Fenger, 
2007) 
“Give it away privatisation”, 
high rate of homeownership. Dualist 
rental market (Kemeny, 1995; 2005) 
National support for mortgage finance, poorly 
developed housing finance system (Hypostat, 2015; 
Stephens, 2003) 
Average protection of permanent 
workers against individual and 
collective dismissal. Use of 
temporary contracts among youth 
(Scarpetta, 2014) 
UK Liberal (Esping-
Andersen,1990) 
High share of homeownership, 
increase in mortgage undertaking 
after de-regulation. Dualist rental 
market (Kemeny, 1995; 2005) 
Public-private assurance scheme for mortgage 
repayments. Very accessible mortgage market 
(Bicakova and Sierminska 2008; Neuteboom, 2004; 
Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004; Fuentes et al., 2013) 
Relatively unrestrictive 
regulation for individual and 
collective dismissal (Scarpetta, 
2014; Booth et al., 2002) 
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Table 2 Construction of the household-level employment insecurity variable 
 His position 
 Employee permanent Employee temporary Self-employed Not employed 
Her position     
Employee permanent Both secure One secure and a half One secure and a half One secure 
Employee temporary One secure and a half Insecure Insecure Insecure 
Self-employed One secure and a half Insecure Insecure Insecure 
Not employed One secure Insecure Insecure  
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Table 3 Summary statistics by country and overall. EU-SILC, 2010/2012 own calculation. 
        
 DE ES FR IT PL UK Total 
        
Mortgage .25 .7 .43 .41 .4 .56 .46 
Tenant .66 .2 .32 .31 .18 .31 .32 
Reduced Rent .049 .023 .21 .054 .059 .12 .1 
Free accommodation .04 .077 .041 .22 .36 .014 .11 
        
Both secure .44 .29 .43 .28 .26 .62 .4 
One secure and a half .17 .24 .23 .23 .24 .13 .21 
One secure .27 .22 .18 .27 .2 .19 .21 
Both insecure .12 .24 .15 .22 .3 .059 .18 
        
Earnings in Euros and adjusted 
for PPP - EU28 
       
25p 28805 20265 25353 22131 13679 27058 21838 
Median 43233 31069 36245 35198 20618 42082 34163 
75p 58421 41595 46729 47131 31431 58793 47771 
        
Education male partner        
Low ed. .053 .39 .08 .32 .052 .053 .15 
Medium ed. .44 .24 .5 .5 .57 .5 .46 
High ed. .51 .36 .42 .18 .37 .45 .4 
        
Education female partner        
Low ed. .056 .31 .062 .2 .052 .033 .11 
Medium ed. .4 .24 .41 .52 .44 .45 .4 
High ed. .54 .45 .52 .28 .51 .52 .49 
        
Population density        
Densely populated .49 .47 .46 .37 .52 .61 .49 
Intermediate .33 .25 .28 .42 .14 .27 .27 
Thinly populated .18 .28 .26 .2 .34 .12 .24 
        
Age of household head (mean) 31 32 30 32 31 31 31 
        
Not married .42 .33 .64 .22 .13 .47 .41 
        
Number of children (mean) .76 .74 .88 .84 1.1 .92 .88 
        
Age of the youngest child        
No children in the household .51 .5 .46 .41 .27 .46 .44 
0 /1 .15 .17 .21 .27 .2 .22 .2 
2/4 .24 .24 .26 .24 .35 .22 .26 
5+ .092 .092 .064 .076 .19 .11 .1 
        
2010 0 .42 .32 0 .32 .26 .25 
2011 .51 .3 .33 .55 .33 .31 .37 
2012 .49 .28 .35 .45 .35 .43 .38 
        
N 1186 1538 2569 904 1370 1384 8951 
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Figure 1 Predicted probabilities of being mortgage holders by earnings (Panel A), employment insecurity (Panel B) and employment insecurity at 
the 75th percentile of the earnings distribution (Panel C). Couples age 18-35. Predictions are adjusted for age of the oldest partner, education, 
marital status, presence and number of children, degree of urbanization and year. EU-SILC, 2010/2012 own calculation. 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of being mortgage holders by employment insecurity and earnings. Couples age 18-35. Predictions are adjusted 
for age of the oldest partner, education, marital status, presence and number of children, degree of urbanization and year. EU-SILC, 2010/2012 own 
calculation. 
 
 
